A Mixed-Logical-Dynamical model for Automated Driving on highways by Fabiani, Filippo & Grammatico, Sergio
A Mixed-Logical-Dynamical model for Automated Driving on highways
Filippo Fabiani and Sergio Grammatico
Abstract— We propose a hybrid decision-making framework
for safe and efficient autonomous driving of selfish vehicles
on highways. Specifically, we model the dynamics of each
vehicle as a Mixed-Logical-Dynamical system and propose
simple driving rules to prevent potential sources of conflict
among neighboring vehicles. We formalize the coordination
problem as a generalized mixed-integer potential game, where
an equilibrium solution generates a sequence of mixed-integer
decisions for the vehicles that trade off individual optimality
and overall safety.
I. INTRODUCTION
Automated Driving (AD) is currently foreseen as the
future of road traffic to enhance safety and efficiency. Within
the system-and-control community, multi-vehicle coordina-
tion, motion planning and control for AD has attracted a
strong research attention, since it poses relevant engineering
challenges, spanning from fundamental to computational and
practical challenges. Providing each vehicle with a high
degree of decision-making autonomy is in fact key towards
automated road traffic. From an optimal-control perspective,
to autonomously drive vehicles within a complex dynamic
environment, several algorithms propose a Model Predictive
Control (MPC) approach [1], [2], [3], or some variants,
such as scenario-based MPC [4], spatial-based MPC [5], and
distributed MPC [6], [7], as well as multi-layer decision-
making frameworks [8], [9].
The quintessential feature in multi-vehicle driving scenar-
ios is that drivers are selfish decision makers, or agents, that
pursue their own individual interests, e.g. minimum travel
time or minimum fuel consumption, while sharing the road
space-time. To handle the presence of selfish vehicles, the
principles of game theory have been adopted, first in high-
level traffic control [10], and more recently in multi-vehicle
motion planning [11], [12], [13].
In this paper, compared with the referred literature, we
consider a general driving scenario on multi-lane highways
with multiple vehicles, each with a cost function to be
minimized given the driving decisions of the other vehicles,
individual constraints, e.g. speed and acceleration limits, and
safety-distance constraints. Furthermore, for each vehicle,
we embed both continuous and discrete decisions over a
prediction horizon, namely, the longitudinal cruise speed and
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Fig. 1: A set of vehicles driving along a highway.
the occupied lane in the highway, respectively, see Fig. 1
for an illustration. This motivates us to model the dynamics
of each noncooperative vehicle over a certain horizon as a
Mixed-Logical-Dynamical (MLD) system [14].
The presence of multiple noncooperative agents with
mixed-integer decision variables and safety constraints com-
plicates enormously the solution of the inter-dependent
decision-making problems, as conflicts naturally arise [15].
For instance, one conflict arises when two vehicles aim
at swapping their lanes by simultaneously activating their
direction indicators, see Fig. 2. Conflicts arise even on a
single lane, when a fast vehicle approaches a slower one,
hence the two “compete” for the free space, see Fig. 3.
j
i
Fig. 2: Two vehicles traveling side by side along two
consecutive lanes. Vehicle j (left lane) has the right indicator
on, while i (right lane) the left one.
Our approach to resolve conflicts and potential collisions
is by introducing some “AD rules” (§IV). For simplicity,
we assume that each vehicle is aware of the planning of
its neighboring vehicles, e.g. by exchanging information
and/or estimating the motion of the neighboring vehicles
(§II). Finally, we formalize the multi-vehicle AD problem
as a generalized mixed-integer potential game (§V), where
an equilibrium solution, obtained via a Gauss-Southwell
algorithm (§VI), corresponds to a sequence of mixed-integer
decisions for the vehicles that are individually optimal, given
the decisions of the other vehicles and the imposed AD rules.
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Fig. 3: Two vehicles traveling on the same lane and compet-
ing for the longitudinal free space.
II. HIGHWAY TRAFFIC AS A SYSTEM OF
MIXED-LOGICAL-DYNAMICAL SYSTEM
Let I := {1, . . . , N} be the set of vehicles driving on
a highway with lane set L := {1, . . . , L}. For any pair of
vehicles (i, j), let di,j ∈ R denote the inter-vehicle distance
between i and j. Throughout the paper, we refer to i as a
generic vehicle in I and to j as a vehicle in the neighborhood
of vehicle i, i.e., Ni := {j ∈ I | |di,j | ≤ d¯}, where
d¯ > 0 denotes a predefined interaction distance. As shown in
Fig. 1, we assume that each vehicle i controls its longitudinal
(cruise) speed vi ∈ Vi ⊂ R and selects the traveling lane
zi ∈ L. Over a prediction horizon T ≥ 1, each vehicle i
has decision variables vi := [vi(1); . . . ; vi(T )] ∈ VTi and
zi := [zi(1); . . . ; zi(T )] ∈ LT . We assume that vehicle
i seeks for a sequence of hybrid decisions that trade off
the tracking of a desired speed profile vdi ∈ VTi , while
driving along a desired lane zdi ∈ LT . Therefore, we can
preliminary formulate the MPC motion planning as a Mixed-
Integer Linear Programming (MILP):
min
vi,zi
|vi − vdi |+ ri|zi − zdi |
s.t. vi(t+ 1) ∈ Vi(t), ∀t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}
zi(t+ 1) ∈ Li(t), ∀t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1},
(1)
where ri > 0. The sets Vi and Li ⊂ L shall be defined to
limit the cruise speed and its variations, and the selected lane.
For instance, given v¯i and ∆i > 0 as the maximum velocity
and acceleration/deceleration for vehicle i, respectively, we
can define:
Vi(t) := [0, v¯i] ∩ [vi(t)−∆i, vi(t) + ∆i]
Li(t) := L ∩ [zi(t)− 1, zi(t) + 1] .
To model the longitudinal distance between pairs of ve-
hicles, we adopt the Euler forward scheme as updating rule
for the relative distance between the vehicle i and j ∈ Ni:
di,j(t+ 1) := di,j(t) + τ (vj(t)− vi(t)) , (2)
where τ > 0 denotes the length of a predefined time interval.
It follows that within the introduced hybrid MPC framework,
each vehicle can estimate the relative distance with respect
to its neighboring vehicles by knowing their velocities.
In this paper, we do not address the issue of communica-
tion among vehicles. Our aim is instead to design a hybrid
framework capable to model the AD problem in highways.
Specifically, we focus on the mixed-integer decision-making
layer for coordination and motion planning of the vehicles.
Therefore, in the remainder of the paper, we assume that:
i) each vehicle is driven autonomously by the solution
of the hybrid decision-making framework; ii) vehicles can
exchange information, i.e., their decision variables, without
communication delays or packet loss. By starting from (1),
and in the spirit of [14], we introduce several mixed-logical
coupling constraints among vehicles that lie within a certain
set, with the aim to ensure safety.
A. Safety distance
The first mixed-logical coupling constraint we introduce
refers to the safety distance among vehicles traveling on the
same lane. Directly from the common driving experience
in highways, it seems reasonable to assume the safety
distance, dsi > 0, as a function of the actual cruise speed,
dsi = d
s
i(vi(t)). For instance, compared to driving at high
speed, we are induced to get closer to the vehicle ahead at
low speed. Thus, let us define the discrete variable li,j :=
zj − zi, where zi and zj are the lane selected by vehicle
i and j, respectively, and introduce the following logical
implications, for all t ∈ {0, . . . , T}:
[li,j(t) = 0] ∧ [|di,j(t)| ≥ 0] =⇒ [|di,j(t)| ≥ dsi(t)] . (3)
The necessary conditions on the left-hand side, which must
occur simultaneously, allow to select only those vehicles that,
in the prediction of vehicle i, occupy the same lane. Note that
the inequality |di,j(t)| ≥ 0 allows one to cluster the vehicles
in Ni as either ahead i or behind i. Then, for all t and j
for which both the conditions are met, the relative distance
di,j(t) must be greater or equal than the safety distance dsi(t).
Definition 1 (Longitudinal safety): A pair of vehicles
(i, j) ∈ I2 is longitudinally safe over the prediction horizon
T if, for all t ∈ {0, . . . , T} such that zi(t) = zj(t),
|di,j(t)| ≥ dsi(t) and, furthermore, if zi(t + 1) = zj(t + 1),
di,j(t+1)·di,j(t) ≥ 0. The system is longitudinally safe over
the prediction horizon T if any pair of vehicles (i, j) ∈ I2
is longitudinally safe. 
B. Direction indicators
Lane change maneuvers are particularly challenging to
automate because each vehicle has to adapt its actions
to several road users. Inspired by a common practice in
a multi-lane environment, here we introduce integer-linear
constraints to characterize the direction indicators and their
utilization in the lane change maneuver. Next, we will show
how to exploit it to rule out potential source of collision
among vehicles, as in Fig. 2.
To model the direction indicators, we introduce two binary
decision variables, ari and a
l
i. Specifically, a
r
i = 1 denotes
that vehicle i has its right direction indicator on, hence wants
to change its current lane, moving to the right; analogously,
ali = 1 denotes that vehicle i has left direction indicator
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Fig. 4: Example of longitudinal collision: (a) Velocity pro-
files. (b) Relative and safety distances.
turned on. At each time t, the vehicles may turn only one
indicator on. This translates into an exclusive OR constraint:
ali(t) + a
r
i(t) ≤ 1. (4)
Next, we impose that vehicles may perform a lane-change
maneuver only after activating the suitable direction indica-
tor. Thus, for all t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}, we define
L¯i(t) := Li(t) ∩
[
zi(t)− ari(t), zi(t) + ali(t)
]
. (5)
hence, the feasible-lane constraint reads as zi(t + 1) ∈
L¯i(t). Although the activation of the direction indicator
is mandatory before a lane change, we remark that the
constraints that define L¯i do not force the lane change, but
instead they make it possible in the next time interval.
III. SAFETY RULES FOR MULTI-LANE TRAFFIC
The logical implications introduced above allow for unsafe
driving scenarios. In the following, after analyzing these
scenarios, we propose some “autonomous driving rule” that
rule out potential sources of collision.
A. A free-space agreement on the lane
Let us consider the situation in Fig. 3, where a feasible
scenario is that vehicle i accelerates, to e.g. minimize its
traveling time, while vehicle j reduces its speed, e.g. with
the aim to minimize fuel consumption. In terms of velocity
profile, an optimal strategy exists for both the vehicles
(Fig. 4a), i.e., the MILPs problems in (1) with additional
constraints are feasible. However, since the vehicles travel on
the same lane, such strategies are clearly not implementable
because they lead to a collision, as shown in Fig. 4b.
To rule out this unsafe scenario, we propose an “agree-
ment” on the free space available between vehicles traveling
on the same lane. Specifically, under the same necessary con-
ditions in (3), we impose that the relative velocity between
two vehicles in consecutive steps shall be limited.
In details, let us refer to Fig. 3 and let introduce vi,j :=
vj − vi as the relative velocity between vehicle i and j.
Then, we have, for all j ∈ Ni and t ∈ {1, . . . , T}:
[li,j(t) = 0] ∧ [di,j(t) ≥ 0]
=⇒
[
vi,j(t) ≥ − 12 di,j(t)−d
s
i(t)
τ
]
, (6a)
[li,j(t) = 0] ∧ [di,j(t) ≤ 0]
=⇒
[
vi,j(t) ≤ − 12 di,j(t)+d
s
i(t)
τ
]
. (6b)
Informally speaking, at each time interval, each vehicle is
allowed to (selfishly) exploit only a portion (at most half) of
the free longitudinal space. We emphasize that the condition
di,j(t + 1) · di,j(t) ≥ 0 in Definition 1 would introduce
nonlinear constraints. In fact, this motivates our agreement
rule in (6) that introduces mixed-integer linear constraints.
Proposition 1: Given a pair of vehicles (i, j) ∈ I2,
assume that vi(0), vj(0) are feasible. The hybrid MPC for-
mulation in (1) with safety distance constraints (3) and free-
space agreement (6) guarantees the longitudinal safety. 
Proof: Without restriction, assume that dsi(t) = d
s > 0,
for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T} and i ∈ {1, 2}. The free space at step
t between two vehicles is di,j(t)− ds = −dj,i(t)− ds > 0.
Directly from (6a), we have τvi(t) ≤ τvj(t)+ 12 (di,j(t)−ds).
Therefore, by the definition of di,j(t + 1) in (2), we obtain
di,j(t+1)−di,j(t) ≥ 12 (ds−di,j(t)), which turns into di,j(t+
1) ≥ 12 (ds + di,j(t)). From (3), di,j(t) ≥ ds. In the worst
case, i.e., when di,j(t) = ds, we obtain di,j(t + 1) ≥ ds.
Now, a longitudinal collision happens if:{
−di,j(t+ 1) + di,j(t) ≥ 2ds
di,j(t+ 1) ≤ 0,
i.e.,
{
vi,j(t) ≤ −2dsτ
vi,j(t) ≤ −di,j(t)τ .
(7)
By (6a), we have that:
2di,j(t+ 1)− di,j(t) ≥ ds =⇒ vi,j(t) ≥ 12 d
s−di,j(t)
τ . (8)
Finally, (8) fulfill the conditions in (7) if:{
1
2
ds−di,j(t)
τ ≤ −di,j(t)τ
1
2
ds−di,j(t)
τ ≤ −2d
s
τ
=⇒
{
di,j(t) ≤ −ds
di,j(t) ≥ 5ds
The latter system has no solution due to the fact that ds > 0.
This implies that the free-space agreement is sufficient to
avoid that conditions in (7) may occur.
B. The need for direction indicators
In this subsection, we exploit the direction indicators
to avoid unsafe scenarios between vehicles on consecutive
lanes. Let us consider the scenario depicted in Fig. 2. The
safety-distance logical implications in (3) do not allow to
change lane individually over the prediction horizon T , due
to the small relative distance between them. However, the
situation is different if both vehicles aim to perform the
same maneuver in “opposite directions”, swapping the lanes
as showed in Fig. 5a. In this case, both predict that the
destination lane will be free during the successive time
intervals. Therefore, it is possible that by keeping their
own speed unchanged, as well as relative distance, the two
vehicles perform the lane change at the same time, causing a
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Fig. 5: Example of lateral collision between two vehicles:
(a) Lane profiles. (b) Relative distance.
collision. However, these unsafe maneuvers are feasible for
the hybrid motion planning in (1).
We then introduce dˆ > 0 as the inter-distance between
vehicles that could lead to a lateral collision during a
simultaneous change lane. We remark that dˆ shall be chosen
large enough to exclude potential conflict on consecutive
lane, accordingly to the following definition.
Definition 2 (Consecutive lane safety): A pair of vehicles
(i, j) ∈ I2 is safe on consecutive lanes over the prediction
horizon T if, for all t ∈ {0, . . . , T} such that |di,j(t)| ≤ dˆ
and |li,j(t)| = 1, zi(t + 1) 6= zj(t) and zj(t + 1) 6= zi(t).
The system is safe on consecutive lanes over the prediction
horizon T if any pair of vehicles (i, j) ∈ I2 is safe on
consecutive lanes. 
To avoid lateral collisions caused by simultaneous lane
changes, we propose an additional mixed-logical rule that
exploits the direction indicators. Without restriction, we refer
to a scenario involving a pair of vehicles as the one illustrated
in Fig. 2. Thus, two vehicles (i, j) travel side by side on
consecutive lanes if |di,j(t)| ≤ dˆ and li,j(t) = 1. In case
of both vehicles express the will of change lane performing
a swap, i.e., vehicle i turns on the left indicator ali, while
the vehicle j the right one arj at the same time t, then we
force the vehicle traveling on a lower lane to keep it, that
is zi(t + 1) = zi(t). Note that the proposed solution is one
possible solution to resolve conflicts on consecutive lanes.
Higher lanes are usually deputed for overtaking maneuvers,
hence vehicles should facilitate the re-entry towards lower
lanes. This motivates our proposed solution. Thus, the logical
rule reads as:
[li,j(t) = 1] ∧ [|di,j(t)| ≤ dˆ] ∧ {[ali(t) = 1] ∧ [arj(t) = 1]}
=⇒ [zi(t+ 1)− zi(t) = 0] (9)
Proposition 2: Given a pair of vehicles (i, j) ∈ I2 and
some dˆ > 0 sufficiently large, assume that [vi(0); zi(0)] and
[vj(0); zj(0)] are feasible. The hybrid MPC formulation in
(1) with rule (9) guarantees the consecutive lane safety. 
Proof: By Def. 2, two vehicles might not be safe on
consecutive lanes if zi(t+ 1) = zj(t) and zj(t+ 1) = zi(t).
In view of (5), this is possible only if |li,j(t)| = 1 and each
vehicle turns on the proper direction indicator, i.e., ali(t) = 1
and arj(t) = 1 (or a
r
i(t) = 1 and a
l
j(t) = 1). If |di,j(t)| > dˆ
the vehicles may swap the lanes without collision; otherwise
(9) forces the vehicle driving on a lower lane to keep it.
IV. FROM LOGICAL IMPLICATIONS TO MIXED-INTEGER
LINEAR CONSTRAINTS
In this section we show how to translate the logical impli-
cations in (3), (6), (9) into mixed-integer linear constraints
suitable for (1). By referring to the vehicle i, we introduce
the constraints to be designed for each neighboring vehicle
j ∈ Ni and for each time t ∈ {1, . . . , T}.
A. Preliminaries
Let us consider the safety distance constraints in (3). We
introduce two further logical implications and related binary
variables, α, β ∈ {0, 1}, which allow to discriminate only
such vehicles that effectively travel along the same lane
(li,j = 0) of the i-th one, either ahead (β = 1) or behind it
(β = 0):
[αi,j(t) = 1] ⇐⇒ [li,j(t) ≤ 0] ∧ [li,j(t) ≥ 0] , (10a)
[βi,j(t) = 1] ⇐⇒ [di,j(t) ≥ 0] . (10b)
Hence, equations (3), (6) can be rewritten as nonlinear
inequalities:
αi,j(t) [βi,j(t) (d
s
i(t)− di,j(t))
+ (1− βi,j(t)) (dsi(t) + di,j(t))] ≤ 0, (11a)
αi,j(t) [−βi,j(t) (2τvi,j(t) + di,j(t)− dsi(t))
+ (1− βi,j(t)) (2τvi,j(t) + di,j(t) + dsi(t))] ≤ 0.
(11b)
In a similar way, it is possible to handle (9) with some
extra binary variables, γ, δ and ζ. Thus, we then introduce
the associated logical implications:
[γi,j(t) = 1] ⇐⇒ [li,j(t) ≤ 1] ∧ [li,j(t) ≥ 1] , (12a)
[δi,j(t) = 1] ⇐⇒ [ali(t) = 1] ∧ [arj(t) = 1], (12b)
[ζi,j(t) = 1] ⇐⇒ [di,j(t) ≤ dˆ] ∨ [di,j(t) ≥ −dˆ], (12c)
which allow to equivalently reformulate (9) as:
γi,j(t)δi,j(t)ζi,j(t) (zi(t+ 1)− zi(t)) = 0. (13)
B. The mixed-integer linear constraints
For the sake of clarity, we define several patterns of
inequalities that allow to handle all the constraints. Given
a linear function f : R→ R, let define M := maxx∈X f(x),
m := minx∈X f(x) with X compact set. Then, with c ∈
R and δ ∈ {0, 1}, a first system S≥ of mixed-integer
inequalities correspond to [δ = 1] ⇐⇒ [f(x) ≥ c], i.e.,
S≥(δ, f(x), c) :=
{
(c−m)δ ≤ f(x)−m
(M − c+ )δ ≥ f(x)− c+ ,
while a second S≤ to [δ = 1] ⇐⇒ [f(x) ≤ c]:
S≤(δ, f(x), c) :=
{
(M − c)δ ≤M − f(x)
(c+ −m)δ ≥ + c− f(x).
Here  > 0 is a small tolerance beyond which the
constraint is regarded as violated. As an example, let con-
sider the right-hand side in (10a): introducing η, θ ∈
{0, 1}, [ηi,j(t) = 1] ⇐⇒ [li,j(t) ≤ 0] translates into
S≤(ηi,j(t), li,j(t), 0), while [θi,j(t) = 1] ⇐⇒ [li,j(t) ≥ 0]
into S≥(θi,j(t), li,j(t), 0). Moreover, we define the next two
blocks of inequalities, involving only binary variables, which
allow to solve propositions with logical AND:
S∧(δ, σ, γ) :=

−σ + δ ≤ 0
−γ + δ ≤ 0
σ + γ − δ ≤ 1,
and with logical OR:
S∨(δ, σ, γ) :=

σ − δ ≤ 0
γ − δ ≤ 0
−σ − γ + δ ≤ 0.
Specifically, [δ = 1] ⇐⇒ [σ = 1] ∧ [γ = 1] is equivalent
to the integer inequalities S∧(δ, σ, γ), while [δ = 1] ⇐⇒
[σ = 1] ∨ [γ = 1] into S∨(δ, σ, γ). Referring again to (10a),
[αi,j(t) = 1] ⇐⇒ [ηi,j(t) = 1] ∧ [θi,j(t) = 1] corresponds
to S∧(αi,j(t), ηi,j(t), θi,j(t)). Finally, (10a) coincides with
the system of mixed-integer inequalities given by:
(10a) =⇒

S≤(ηi,j(t), li,j(t), 0),
S≥(θi,j(t), li,j(t), 0),
S∧(αi,j(t), ηi,j(t), θi,j(t)).
(14)
Thus, it follows that:
(10b) =⇒ S≥(βi,j(t), di,j(t), 0). (15)
(12a) =⇒

S≤(κi,j(t), li,j(t), 1),
S≥(λi,j(t), li,j(t), 1),
S∧(γi,j(t), κi,j(t), λi,j(t)).
(16)
(12b) =⇒ S∧(δi,j(t), ali(t), arj(t)). (17)
(12c) =⇒

S≤(µi,j(t), di,j(t), dˆ),
S≥(νi,j(t), di,j(t),−dˆ),
S∨(ζi,j(t), µi,j(t), νi,j(t)).
(18)
Next, we follow the procedure in [14] to recast the inequal-
ities in (11) and (13) into a mixed-integer linear formulation
by means of additional auxiliary variables (both real and
binary, [16]). Specifically, starting from (11), we define
ξi,j := αi,jβi,j , which satisfies the system of inequalities
S∧(ξi,j(t), αi,j(t), βi,j(t)). (19)
By referring to (11a), we also define the real auxiliary
variables fi,j := ξi,jdi,j , gi,j := αi,jdsi and hi,j := αi,jdi,j
that shall satisfy the pattern of linear inequalities given by:
S⇒(g, f(x), δ) :=
{
mδ ≤ g ≤Mδ
−M(1− δ) ≤ g − f(x) ≤ −m(1− δ)
The latter is equivalent to: [δ = 0] =⇒ [g = 0], while
[δ = 1] =⇒ [g = f(x)]. Hence, for each real auxiliary
variable previously introduced, we have the systems:
S⇒(fi,j(t), di,j(t), ξi,j(t)), (20)
S⇒(gi,j(t), dsi(t), αi,j(t)), (21)
S⇒(hi,j(t), di,j(t), αi,j(t)). (22)
Thus, the nonlinear inequalities in (11a) becomes:
− 2fi,j(t) + gi,j(t) + hi,j(t) ≤ 0. (23)
Now, let us consider (11b). We define two real auxiliary
variables, ki,j = ξi,jvi and mi,j = αi,jvi, that satisfy:
S⇒(ki,j(t), vi(t), ξi,j(t)), (24)
S⇒(mi,j(t), vi(t), αi,j(t)). (25)
Hence, (11b) is rewritten with linear formulation as:
2τ(2ki,j(t)−mi,j(t))− 2fi,j(t) + gi,j(t) + hi,j(t)
+ 2τ(αi,j(t)− 2ξi,j(t))vj(t) ≤ 0.
(26)
Finally, we proceed with the same procedure as for (13)
by introducing two auxiliary binary variables, φi,j := γi,jδi,j
and ψi,j := φi,jζi,j , that satisfy the systems
S∧(φi,j(t), γi,j(t), δi,j(t)), (27)
S∧(ψi,j(t), ζi,j(t), φi,j(t)), (28)
and two discrete variables, pi,j := ψi,jzi(t) and si,j :=
ψi,jzi(t+ 1), so that we obtain:{
−si,j(t) + pi,j(t) ≤ 0
si,j(t)− pi,j(t) ≤ 0.
(29)
Then, the variables si,j and ui,j satisfy the inequalities
S⇒(pi,j(t), zi(t), ψi,j(t)), (30)
S⇒(si,j(t), zi(t+ 1), ψi,j(t)). (31)
C. The final mixed-integer linear model
In the previous subsection, for each vehicle i, we have in-
troduced 21 auxiliary variables, both continuous and discrete,
and 71 mixed-integer linear constraints. By rearranging all
the inequalities, we propose the final MILP for each vehicle:
min
qi,vi,...,si
qi
s.t. − qi1 ≤ vi − vdi ≤ qi1
− qi1 ≤ ri(zi − zdi ) ≤ qi1
vi(t+ 1) ∈ Vi(t), ∀t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}
zi(t+ 1) ∈ L¯i(t), ∀t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}
(4), ∀t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}
(14)− (31), ∀j ∈ Ni, ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T}.
(32)
The total number of mixed-integer linear constraints for
player i is ci := T (67|Ni| + 9), while for the whole
neighborhood is c := (
∑
j∈Ni cj) + ci. Note that the
coupling constraints in (14) − (31) contain the strategies
of the neighbors as affine, given terms. Thus, by defining
xi := [qi;vi; . . . ; si] ∈ Rni , where ni := 1 +T (21|Ni|+ 4),
and x ∈ Rn, n := (∑j∈Ni nj) + ni, as the vector of all the
decision variables in the neighborhood Ni:
min
xi
w>i xi s.t. Ax ≤ b (33)
for suitable wi ∈ Rni , A ∈ Rc×n, b ∈ Rc vectors and
matrices of suitable structure.
V. AUTOMATED DRIVING AS A GENERALIZED
MIXED-INTEGER POTENTIAL GAME
Within our hybrid framework, selfish road users can
be driven by a set of mutually influencing mixed-integer
strategies obtained by solving (33) for all i ∈ I. Thus, we
aim at designing suitable sequences of decision variables
that control each vehicle towards its own goal, without
compromising the overall safety. To achieve such a trade-
off, we propose to formalize the AD coordination problem
as a generalized mixed-integer potential game.
We preliminary define the feasible set of each player,
namely Xi(x−i) := {xi ∈ Rni | A[xi; x−i] ≤ b}, and
X := {x ∈ Rn | Ax ≤ b}. Furthermore, by noticing that
each Ji(xi) := w>i xi depends only on the local variable xi,
we introduce the function P (x) :=
∑
i∈I Ji(xi). By [17],
P is an exact potential function for the proposed AD game
because it satisfies, for all i ∈ I, for all x−i, and for all xi,
yi ∈ Xi(x−i),
P (xi,x−i)− P (yi,x−i) = Ji(xi)− Ji(yi).
Let us now introduce the mixed-integer best response
mapping for player (i.e., vehicle) i, given the strategies of
its neighbors x−i:
x?i (x−i) ∈ argmin
xi
Ji(xi) s.t. (xi,x−i) ∈ X
Definition 3 (ε-Mixed-Integer Nash Equilibrium): Let
ε > 0. x¯ ∈ X is an ε-Mixed-Integer Nash Equilibrium
(ε-MINE) of the game if, for all i ∈ I,
Ji(x¯i)− Ji(x∗i ) ≤ ε,
where x∗i ∈ x?i (x¯−i). 
Any ε-global minimizer of the potential function P , i.e.,
any x¯ ∈ X such that P (x¯) ≤ P (x) + ε for all x ∈ X , is
an ε-MINE of the generalized mixed-integer potential game
[18, Th. 2]. The converse does not hold in general.
It follows that an ε-MINE is a vector of (individually)
optimal strategies that allows to safely coordinate a set of
noncooperative vehicles driving on a highway.
VI. GAME RESOLUTION AND NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
VIA GAUSS-SOUTHWELL ALGORITHM
In this section, we show numerical results obtained by
solving the mixed-integer potential game associated with the
AD problem. To compute an ε-MINE, we adopt the best-
response-based Gauss-Southwell (GS) method, described
next. At each algorithmic step k, an arbitrary i = ik ∈ I
is chosen; then, vehicle i updates its decision variable as
follows:
xi(k+ 1) =
{
x∗i (k) if Ji(xi(k))− Ji(x∗i (k)) ≥ ε
xi(k) otherwise,
(34)
with x∗i (k) ∈ x?i (x−i(k)), while x−i(k+ 1) = x−i(k). The
iteration goes on until Ji(xi(k))− Ji(x∗i (k)) ≥ ε holds for
all i = ik ∈ I. Under suitable conditions on the sequence
of ik ∈ I, this algorithm converges to an ε-MINE in a finite
number of steps [18, Th. 4].
In Figures 6–7 the logical rules allow to prevent the
potential conflicts illustrated in Figures. 2–3, while Fig. 8
shows an example of multi-lane traffic simulation. Finally,
Tab. I shows the average computational times for solving a
single optimization problem over the full horizon T .
VII. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
A hybrid decision-making framework can model the multi-
lane, multi-vehicle automated driving problem in highways
and, if augmented with simple driving rules, can ensure a
safe use of the road space-time, despite the presence of
selfish vehicles. The decision-making problem can be in
fact modeled as a generalized mixed-integer potential game,
which can be solved iteratively via a Gauss-Southwell best-
response algorithm. Future research will focus on closed-
loop control for the generalized mixed-integer potential game
that arises in multi-vehicle automated driving.
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